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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Shane Anthony Kraly appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to attempted possession of methamphetamine.

Kraly

contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Officer Jeremy Inman was on patrol one evening when he noticed a
parked vehicle "facing an odd direction." (5/20/2014 Tr., p.47, Ls.5-16.) Officer
Inman entered the parking lot to "contact the vehicle" to "[s]ee if anyone was
inside of it" "[b]ecause it wasn't parked properly in the parking stalls." (5/20/2014
Tr., p.50, L.22 - p.51, L.10.)

Officer Inman "parked approximately 30 feet

northwest of the front of th[e] vehicle," and "to the vehicle's left." (5/20/2014 Tr.,
p.53, Ls.10-21.)

Officer Inman did not active his "rotator lights" or his "rear

flashing amber" lights; the only lights he had on were his headlights, which were
pointed in the direction of the parked vehicle. (5/20/2014 Tr., p.54, L.24 - p.55,
L.9.)
As Officer Inman approached the vehicle, he "noticed two people inside of
it," one in the driver's seat and one in the passenger's seat. (5/20/2014 Tr., p.54,
Ls.9-23.) When Officer Inman walked up, the driver's side window was down,
and Kraly was sitting in the driver's seat. (5/20/2014 Tr., p.55, Ls.20-23, p.56,
Ls.3-4.) Officer Inman noticed Kraly was "fidgety, unable to maintain basically
sitting still, constantly moving around, making erratic movements[,]" and was
"[r]eally jittery."

(5/20/2014 Tr., p.56, Ls.9-13.) Officer Inman recognized this
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behavior as consistent with "stimulant use, more commonly methamphetamine."
(5/20/2014 Tr.,

14-22.) Officer Inman commented that Kraly was parked

in a "weird spot" and asked what they were doing there. (5/20/2014 Tr., p.57,
Ls.1-5.) Kraly responded that he and his companion were "spending some alone
time together."

(5/20/2014 Tr., p.57, Ls.3-7.) When Officer Inman requested

identification, "Kraly said he did not have his identification on him but gave
[Officer Inman] the name of Robert Kraly," who was Kraly's brother; the
passenger, Tiffany Baldwin, provided a driver's license and disclosed to Officer
Inman that "she thought she had a warrant for her arrest." (5/20/2014 Tr., p.58,
Ls.4-15; see 5/20/2014 Tr., p.44, Ls.2-3 (name of Kraly's co-defendant); see R.,
p.131 n.1 (noting Kraly gave a false name to Inman, i.e., Kraly's

brother's

name).)
As Officer Inman was returning to his patrol car to "advise[] Bonner
Communications who [he] was out with and to check for warrants" on Baldwin,
he requested assistance from a "narcotics canine." (5/20/2014 Tr., p.58, L.25 p.59, L.20.)
Kraly was

Dispatch confirmed Baldwin had a warrant but indicated "Robert
valid

and

clear."

(5/20/2014 Tr.,

p.60,

Ls.17-22.)

While

communicating with dispatch, the canine officer, and a reserve officer who was
with him, arrived on scene. (5/20/2014 Tr., p.59, L.21 - p.62, L.8.) One of the
officers arrested Baldwin, at which time he saw a syringe on the passenger seat
after Baldwin exited the car. (5/20/2014 Tr., p.62, Ls.10-21.) As a result, Kraly
was also asked to exit the vehicle.

(5/20/2014 Tr., p.62, Ls.14-16, 22-23.) A
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search of Baldwin's purse incident to her arrest uncovered a scale. (5/20/2014
, p.64,

1

The drug dog was then deployed around Kraly's car, and it alerted.
(5/20/2014 Tr., p.64, Ls.8-19, p.66, Ls.2-4.) The ensuing search revealed "[t]wo
methamphetamine pipes directly behind the driver's seat under the floor mat,"
"[a] piece of methamphetamine located on top of the carpet directly between the
driver's and passenger seat right behind it in the back seat area," and "another
working digital scale located in the back seat." (5/20/2014 Tr., p.66, Ls.8-14.)
The state charged Kraly with possession of methamphetamine.

(R.,

pp.32-33, 63-64.) Pursuant to Kraly's motion, this charge was consolidated with
another case, Case No. 2014-838, in which the state charged Kraly with
providing false information. (R., pp.36, 43, 53, 71, 217.) Kraly filed a motion to
suppress, asserting "[t]here was no probable cause to stop, detain or arrest" him.
(R., pp.75, 118.) The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Kraly's motion,
after which it entered a written decision denying Kraly's request for suppression.
(R., pp.130-135; see generally 5/20/2014 Tr.)
Shortly before trial, Kraly pied guilty. (R., pp.216, 222-223; see generally
9/5/2014 Tr., pp.3-10.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kraly entered a

conditional guilty plea to an amended charge of attempted possession of
methamphetamine, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression
motion, and the state dismissed the providing false information charge.

(R.,

pp.222-235.) The court imposed a suspended unified three-year sentence, with

3

one and one-half
pp.240-246.)

, and placed Kraly on probation for three years. (
a

appeal.

4

, pp.257-259.)

ISSUE
Kraly states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kraly's Motion to
Suppress?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Because the initial encounter was consensual, and the subsequent
detention was justified by reasonable articulable suspicion, has Kraly failed to
establish the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
Kraly Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Kraly asserts the district court erred in denying his suppression motion,

arguing he was "illegally detained" when Officer Inman first made contact with
him and his passenger. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9.) Kraly further contends that
all evidence obtained following the allegedly illegal
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

detention must

be

(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.)

Application of the law to the facts presented at the evidentiary hearing shows
Kraly's arguments fail. The district court correctly concluded that Officer Inman's
initial contact with Kraly and his passenger was consensual, and once the
contact evolved into a detention, it was supported by reasonable articulable
suspicion. (R., p.134.) Accordingly, Kraly was not entitled to suppression of any
evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts.

State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,

485-486, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d
306, 309 (2004).

However, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,

resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in
the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997
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(1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).
The appellate

also gives deference

any implicit findings

the

supported by substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984
P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

Officer lnman's Contact With Kraly Was Lawful From The Outset And
Remained So Throughout
"When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence that is alleged to have

been obtained as a result of an illegal seizure, the defendant bears the burden of
proving that a seizure occurred." State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486, 211
P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (citing State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456
(2004); State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 654, 978 P.2d 212, 214 (1999)). "An
encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not trigger
Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it is nonconsensual." Willoughby, 147 Idaho
at 486, 211 P.3d at 95 (citations omitted). To constitute a seizure, the officer
must, "by means of physical force or show of authority," in some way restrain an
individual's liberty.

!st

This "requires words or actions, or both, by a law

enforcement officer that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer
was ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement."

!st (citations

omitted).

"[A] request for identification or mere questioning is not enough, by itself[,] to
constitute a seizure."

State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226,

1230 (2004) (citations omitted).

The relevant inquiry is whether, under the

totality of the circumstances, "a reasonable person would feel free to disregard
the law enforcement officer"; if so, "then the encounter is consensual."

7

!st

Kraly failed to meet his burden of showing he was seized when Officer
first approached Kraly's vehicle. Officer Inman parked

feet away from

Kraly's car and did not activate his overhead or amber lights in a manner that
might indicate, to a reasonable person, that he was not free to leave. See I.C.

§§ 49-625, 49-1404. The only lights that were on in Officer lnman's patrol car
were his headlights because, at the time, it was dark outside. (5/20/2014 Tr.,
p.47, Ls.22-24, p.55, Ls.5-6, p.70, Ls.15-20, p.71, Ls.6-7.)

Further, Officer

lnman's patrol car did not block Kraly's car, nor did it block any access routes to
or from the parking lot. (5/20/2014 Tr., p.53, Ls.12-21, p.70, Ls.7-10, p.83, Ls.211.) When Officer Inman made contact with Kraly, Kraly's window was already
rolled down, and Officer Inman made no commands; he merely asked Kraly and
his passenger what they were doing "as they were parked in a weird spot."
(5/20/2014 Tr., p.55, L.10 - p.57, L.5.) It was at that point that Officer Inman
observed

Kraly

exhibiting

signs

of

being

under

the

influence

of

methamphetamine, giving Officer Inman reasonable articulable suspicion to
detain Kraly, followed shortly by reasonable articulable suspicion to detain
Baldwin who disclosed that she had an outstanding warrant.
p.56, Ls.9-22, p.58, Ls.4-15.)

(5/20/2014 Tr.,

Based on the evidence presented, the district

court correctly concluded "the initial contact was consensual, and was not a
seizure, and thus, no reasonable suspicion was required." (R., p.134.)
Kraly does not challenge any of the pertinent findings of the district court,
but instead he mischaracterizes part of Officer lnman's testimony, and asserts
"[t]he facts in [State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 831 P.2d 942 (Ct. App. 1991 ),] are
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very similar to those here." (Appellant's Brief,

First, as to the evidence,

Kraly contends that "[a]lthough [he] was not directly blocked

he would have

had to drive around the front of Officer lnman's patrol car or back out in order to
drive away."

(Appellant's Brief, p.7 (citing Tr., p.82, L.20 - p.83, L.5; State's

Exhibit 2).) That was not Officer lnman's testimony either on the transcript pages
Kraly cites or elsewhere. The exchange Kraly cites reads:
Q. Was there any obstruction to the rear of the vehicle? You were
asked on cross examination if Mr. Kraly had put it in reverse and
tried to drive away, et cetera. Was there any obstruction to him
going into reverse and --

A. Only if he would have gone over 40 -- 30, 40 feet, then he
would have an embankment.

Okay. Was your car positioned in such a way that his car
wouldn't have been able to drive away forward?
Q.

A.

No, sir.

(5/20/2014 Tr., p.82, L.20 - p.83, L.5.)
Nothing in the foregoing exchange supports Kraly's implied assertion that
he was indirectly blocked or that he would have "had to drive around the front of
Officer lnman's patrol car or back out in order to drive away." Exhibit 2, which
Kraly also relies on, does not support his claim either.

In fact, there was no

Exhibit 2 admitted at the suppression hearing. (See 5/20/2014 Tr., p.43.) There
was, however, an Exhibit 2 admitted at the preliminary hearing for demonstrative
purposes only; that exhibit is a diagram of the parking lot and the relative location
of the cars. (3/5/2014 Tr., p.26, L.6 - p.27, L.22.) Kraly cannot rely on evidence
that was not presented at the suppression hearing in order to support his claim.
That said, assuming for the sake of argument that Exhibit 1, which was admitted
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the suppression
appea!, 1 is

but does

appear to be included in the record on

diagram admitted as Exhibit 2 at the preliminary

hearing, the exhibit still does not support Kraly's argument.

What Exhibit 2

actually shows is that Kraly could have exited the parking lot by driving alongside
Officer lnman's car and behind it, or by turning to the left and driving out of the
lot, especially since there were no other cars in the parking lot.

(Exhibit 2;

5/20/2014 Tr., p.48, Ls.4-6.) This is consistent with Officer lnman's testimony,
which established that he was in no way blocking Kraly's car.
Kraly's assertion regarding Officer lnman's headlights is also misleading.
Kraly contends:

"Officer Inman parked his patrol car in front of Mr. Kraly's

parked car with the headlights shining into Mr. Kraly's windshield." (Appellant's
Brief, p.7 (citing Tr., p.11, L.10 - p.12, L.24, p.20, Ls.2-17).) Again, the citation
Kraly provides is from the preliminary hearing, not the suppression hearing.
Nevertheless, Officer lnman's testimony at the suppression hearing was
consistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, but it does not support the
implication Kraly would like this Court to draw.

Officer Inman did have his

headlights on when he parked with his car facing Kraly's, but the lights were not,

Kraly is not entitled to this presumption because "[w]hen a party appealing an
issue presents an incomplete record, this Court will presume that the absent
portion supports the findings of the trial court." Willoughby. 147 Idaho at 488,
211 P.3d at 97 (citations omitted).
1

2

The suppression hearing transcript reveals that the diagrams are not the same
because Officer Inman drew Exhibit 1 while testifying at the suppression hearing,
and according to Officer lnman's verbal description, it includes markings, such as
"E1 and E2," which are not included on Exhibit 2. (5/20/2014 Tr., p.49, L.5 p.51, L.4.)
10

as Kraly implies, shining directly at him. Rather, as Officer Inman explained, he
to the left of Kraiy's

and

not see

and

in the car

until he started approaching it on foot, and he could not make out their features
until he was 12-13 feet away. (5/20/2014 Tr., p.53, Ls.15-21, p.55, Ls.7-9, p.71,
Ls.20-23.). Officer lnman's headlights, which were 30 feet away, did not result in
a seizure.
Kraly also highlights that "Officer Inman pointed his flashlight inside the
car and directly into Ms. Baldwin's face." (Appellant's Brief, p.7 (citing 5/20/2014
Tr., p.57, Ls.18-24).) To be clear, Officer lnman's testimony on this point was as
follows:
Q. Okay. Did you have your flashlight out at this time?

A I did have my flashlight on.
Q. Okay. And how were you using it?

A Just shining it in the dash -- towards the dash of the vehicle.
Q. Okay.

A And then when Ms. Baldwin spoke, I flash - I put my flashlight
into her face as well.
Q. Okay. Were you holding it in a menacing manner so as to like
threaten to hit anybody or anything of that nature?

A No, sir.
(5/20/2014 Tr., p.57, L.16 - p.58, L.3.)
Nothing about Officer lnman's use of his flashlight to illuminate the
dashboard, or Baldwin's face when she said she had a warrant, indicates that a
reasonable person in Kraly's position would have believed Officer Inman was
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ordering either Kraly or Baldwin

restrict their movement. In short, the evidence

suppression hearing shows that Kraly failed to meet
of showing he was seized.

burden

Compare Landreth, 139 Idaho at 991, 88 P.3d at

1231 (finding a consensual encounter where officer approached van in parking
lot to inquire about what driver was doing, and holding that brief detention for
driver's license check was not unreasonable).
State v. Randle, 152 Idaho 860, 276 P.3d 732 (Ct. App. 2012), is
instructive because it is factually analogous to this case. In Randle, an officer
noticed the defendant's "vehicle alone in a parking lot with its front-end abutting a
grassy knoll." 152 Idaho at 861, 276 P.3d at 733. "The officer parked his patrol
car approximately two car lengths behind Randle," "left his headlights on," and
"approached the driver's side of Randie's vehicle."

~

"The officer knocked on

Randie's window and Randle opened his door," at which point "the officer noticed
two open beer cans located in a cup holder between the passenger and driver
seats."

~

The officer asked Randle for his driver's license, and he noticed

signs that Randle was under the influence.

~

at 862, 276 P.3d at 734. The

officer later arrested Randle for driving under the influence, and Randle filed an
unsuccessful motion to suppress.

kl

On appeal, Randle claimed he was "trapped," and therefore seized, when
the officer tapped on his window because he "had to respond to the officer's
implied request for communication by either rolling down his window or opening
his door to see what the officer wanted." Randle, 152 Idaho at 863, 276 P.3d at
735. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rejection of this argument
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because "the evidence showed that Randle was

prevented from leaving the

parking lot" because "Randle could have backed

driven away

encounter without running over the officer," and the "officer's vehicle was two car
lengths behind Randie's."

kl

at 863-865, 276 P.3d at 735-737. The Court also

rejected Randie's argument that the Court should "find that, when the officer left
his headlights on, he blocked Randie's exit route because that made it visually
difficult for [him] to back up and leave."

kl

at 865, 276 P.3d at 737. The Court

found Randie's claim was not supported by the record, and it "conclude[d] that
the officer's use of his headlights [] was even less intrusive than the officer's use
of a spotlight in [State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 107 P.3d 1214 (2004)], which
was not found to constitute a seizure." Randle, 152 Idaho at 865, 276 P.3d at
737. The Court of Appeals also observed that it has "previously determined that
police have the right to approach a parked vehicle and ask the occupants
questions, even if no obvious criminal activity is afoot."

kt

(citations omitted).

The totality of the circumstances considered in Randle showed "the officer did
not seize Randle within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment," by parking his
car behind Randie's, leaving his headlights on, and knocking on Randie's
window.

kl

Similarly, no seizure occurred in this case when Officer Inman

parked 30 feet away from Kraly's car, left his headlights on, and spoke with Kraly
through his already-open window.
Kraly does not cite Randle, but instead relies on the Court of Appeals'
opinion in State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 831 P.2d 942 (1991). (Appellant's Brief,
p.7.) .EJy does not support Kraly's position that his initial encounter with Officer

13

was anything but consensual.
were

in

n

defendant and his companion

truck, "which was parked in a lot in downtown Ketchum," where

"[o]ther vehicles were also parked," and "numerous pedestrians were walking
along nearby sidewalks."

E.!:Y,

122 Idaho at 101, 831 P.2d at 943.

At the

suggestion of one officer who drove by and saw Fry and his passenger in the
truck, two officers on foot patrol walked to the parking lot where they saw Fry
unsuccessfully try to pull out of his parking space.

1st

While one officer went to

knock on Fry's window, the other officer stood behind the truck, "preventing Fry
from driving away."

!s:L

"When Fry rolled down the window," the officer "asked

Fry what he was doing and if he could have his driver's license"; the officer "also
detected the odor of alcohol and then had Fry perform a series of field ~obriety
tests," which culminated in Fry being arrested for driving under the influence.

kl

In deciding that Fry was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
the Court of Appeals stated:
Officer Wilson, fully dressed in his police officer's uniform, knocked
on the window of Fry's pickup. Fry rolled down the window and
Wilson asked Fry what he was doing and if Wilson could have his
driver's license. Unlike other cases in which the police request the
subject's cooperation in answering questions, the inquiry here as to
what Fry was doing did not give Fry the option of answering or not.
In addition, the state's characterization of this encounter [as
consensual] ignores the significant fact that, at the time Officer
Wilson approached the driver's window, Officer Dunbar had placed
himself directly behind Fry's vehicle, the front end of which was
nearly against the wall of a building, making it impossible for Fry to
drive away without running over Officer Dunbar. We conclude that
the police conduct in this case would have communicated to a
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about his business. Accordingly, we hold that Fry
was seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment.

E.!:Y,

122 Idaho at 103, 831 P.2d at 945 (citations and quotations omitted).
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Although Kraly claims his case is similar to
in

said.

he ignores most of what

Most notably, Kraly ignores "the

fact" that

another officer "placed himself directly behind Fry's vehicle," which made it
"impossible for Fry to drive away without running over" the officer.
Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

(See

The significant differences between this case and

show that Kraly's reliance on

ErY,

fu

including his misleading recitation of the

Court's decision in that case, does not support his assertion that the district court
erred in denying his suppression motion.
Kraly next appears to argue that Officer Inman lacked reasonable
articulable suspicion to detain him at any point. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) The
record does not support Kraly's argument.
"A police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, detain a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior,
even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest."

EfY,

122 Idaho at

103, 831 P.2d at 945 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).

An

investigatory detention "must be justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion
on the part of the police that the person to be seized had committed or was
about to commit a crime."

19.:.

(citations omitted).

Whether this standard is

satisfied depends on an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.

19.:.

The

totality of the circumstances in this case support Officer lnman's detention of
Kraly after he noticed signs that Kraly was impaired. 3

3

As noted by the district court, Officer Inman could also properly detain Baldwin
after she volunteered that she had an outstanding warrant. (R., p.134.)
15

Officer Inman testified that, when he made contact with Kraly, Kraly "was
fidgety, u

maintain basically sitting still, constantly moving arou

making erratic movements," and was "[r]eally jittery." (5/20/2014 Tr., p.56, Ls.913.)

Based on his training and experience, Officer Inman recognized Kraly's

behavior as consistent with "stimulant use, more commonly methamphetamine."
(5/20/2014 Tr., p.56, Ls.19-22.) Officer Inman admitted Kraly was detained at
this point because Kraly exhibited "signs of impairment of a stimulant use," which
would make it "unsafe [for Kraly] to be driving." (5/20/2014 Tr., p.80, L.21 - p.81,
L.6.) The detention was lawful based on Officer lnman's reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal behavior, and Officer Inman could lawfully request Kraly's
identification as part of his investigation. State v. Howell, _

P.3d _ , 2015

WL 4878579 *2 (Idaho App. 2015) (citation omitted) (" [A] police officer's brief
detention of a driver to make a status check on the driver's license, after making
a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.").
On appeal, Kraly argues "the only information Officer Inman had when he
detained [him] was that [his] car was parked perpendicular to the parking stalls,
the car did not have any lights on, and [he] was 'fidgeting."' (Appellant's Brief,
p.9.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, this is not the argument Kraly
presented to the district court.

In his motion to suppress, Kraly asserted, in

relevant part, that Officer Inman did not have "reasonable, articulable suspicion
or probable cause to stop, detain or arrest" him.

(R., pp.75, 118.)

In his

supporting brief, Kraly argued that Officer "Inman did not have reasonable
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articulable suspicion at the time he drove into the parking
116 (Officer "Inman

"

11

see

no reasonable articulable suspicion

nal

activity was afoot when he approached the car Kraly was in.").) At the outset of
the suppression hearing, the prosecutor agreed that Officer Inman did not have
reasonable articulable suspicion when he entered the parking lot, but such was
not required because "the initial contact was consensual." (5/20/2014 Tr., p.44,
Ls.14-20.)

Kraly did not argue, as he does now, that Officer Inman never

developed reasonable articulable suspicion after the initial consensual contact.
Thus, to the extent Kraly's argument is not preserved, this Court should decline
to consider it. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992)
(issues not raised below generally not considered for the first time on appeal).
Second, Kraly's contention that "the only information Officer Inman had
when he detained" him related to how Kraly's car was parked, whether his lights
were on, and the fact that Kraly was "fidgeting," ignores the bulk of Officer
lnman's testimony explaining why he detained Kraly after he made contact with
him.

As explained, Officer lnman's description of Kraly's behavior was more

than just "fidgeting," and Kraly's behavior was consistent with methamphetamine
use. (5/20/2014 Tr., p.56, Ls.9-22.) This was a sufficient basis to detain Kraly
while Officer Inman investigated further.
Because Officer lnman's contact with, and subsequent detention of, Kraly
was constitutionally permissible, Kraly's claim that the evidence discovered
during the course of the investigation should be suppressed as fruit of the
poisonous tree necessarily fails. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.)
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The district court correctly denied Kraly's motion to suppress; Kraly has
failed to show otherwise.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon

Kraly's

conditional

guilty

plea

to

attempted

possession

of

methamphetamine.
DATED this 21st day of October, 2015.
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